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By  way  of  background,  I  will  begin  with  some  reflections  on  the  wording  of  the  recent
Punta-del-Este  Ministerial  Declaration.  Then I will  identify  and briefly  discuss  six  issues  that
I think should  concern  us.
Background
The  final  text  to  emerge  from the  Punta-del-Este  deliberations,  when  viewed  in  the light  of
earlier drafts and individual country  positions,  probably  provides  some  clues  on  which  issues
will  arise  and how  agriculture is  to  be  handled  in this  round.
The  following  features  of  the "Punta"  declaration  are  interesting.  The  underlining  is  all  mine:
(a)  There  is no  reference  to  any  "special  characteristics"  of agriculture.  However,
agriculture  is still  to  be  treated  separately,  with "Agriculture"  being  one of  several
negotiating  groups  to  be  set  up  under  the umbrella  of the  Group  for  Negotiations  on
Goods  (GNG).
(b)  The agriculture  negotiating  group  will have  primary  but  not exclusive  responsibility
for  agriculture.
(c)  The  "General Principles"  call  for "balanced  concessions  within  sectors"  and  "avoiding
unwarranted  cross-sectoral  demands."
(d)  There  is no agreed  "fast track" for  the agriculture  negotiations,  but  the  "General
Principles"  explicitly  allow  for  the possibility  of an  early  agreement  and  its
implementation.
(e)  All measures  directly  or  indirectly  affecting  agricultural  trade  are  to  be subject  to
negotiations  (no  singling  out of "export subsidies").
(f)  There  is reference  to  a  "phased  reduction" of the  "negative  effects" of subsidies
(not  necessarily  of the subsidies  themselves).  No  specific  time  frame  is  mentioned,
but  the discussion  is stronger  than  the "possible  phased  reduction"  referred  to  in  an
earlier  draft.
Some  Issues
The following  issues  are not  in order of  preceived  importance.
Implications  of  Seeking  to  Balance  Concessions  Within  Agriculture
Will  this really  be  possible?  It seems  to  raise  problems  for countries  with  either little  to  gain
(such  as  Japan) or with  little  to  give  (such  as  Australia, New  Zealand,  and some
developing  countries)  in  the agricultural area.  Hathaway  has  suggested  that it will  pose
problems  for the  United  States,  too.  In the past,  concessions  in  other sectors  were  traded off
for gains  in  agriculture.  It appears that this time  the "bargaining chips" must come  from
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147within  the  agricultural  sector.  Will  the  big  players,  the  United  States  and  the  European
Community  (EC),  be  willing  to  give  the "Australians"  a  free  ride in  the  agricultural
negotiations  and at  the  same  time  exempt  Japan from  making  agricultural  concessions  beyond
those  commensurate  with the  limited  gains  they could  expect?  It  seems  unlikely,  and  I  expect
that some  formal  or informal  mechanism  to  account  for cross-sectoral  tradeoffs  will  probably
evolve.
Political  Will and  Negotiating  Credibility
These  are really  two  closely  related  issues.  The first question  about  whether  the  political  will
really  exists,  despite  the  rhetoric,  to  make  the  necessary  changes,  has  been  raised  by  Johnson.
I think  is  a legitimate  one  for many  countries,  including  Canada.  Given  that significant
changes  in  trade-related  measures  (such  as  barriers  and export  subsidies)  will  of necessity
imply changes  in some  domestic programs,  we  must ask  the  questions:  are  the  politicians
ready  to bite  the  political  bullet?  There  is  no need  for  me  to  remind  you  that  many  groups
within  U.S.  agriculture  such  as  dairy,  sugar,  corn,  and  soybean  interests  benefit from  the
policy status  quo,  including  current  EC measures.  These  groups  could  lose from  reduced
protection  in either  or both countries.  Maybe  the real  political  battle  will  not be  between
countries  but between  the agriculture  ministers and  farm  lobbies  of all  major  countries  in  the
"green corner"  and  all  countries'  finance  ministers and  central  agencies  "in the  red"  (sic).
Perhaps  even  more  important  is  the  credibility  question,  and  I  think  it  applies  to  the  United
States  and  the EC  in  particular.  Will  their  negotiators  really  have  a  mandate  to  commit  their
countries?  How  seriously  should  they  be  taken?  Johnson  refers  to  "Congress's  disdain  for
international  agreements"  and  suggests  that unless  the famous  Section  22  of the  Agricultural
Adjustment  Act  is  repealed  "Congress will  force  violations  of any  trade  agreement."  Certainly,
I  think,  other countries  question  the extent  to  which  the  United  States  is  willing  to  be  bound
by  international  agreements.  This  weakens  the  General  Agreement  on Tariffs  and  Trade
(GATT).
What  seems  to  be  needed  is  a change  in attitude  away  from  the  notion  that  domestic
agricultural  policy  puts  constraints  on  what  can  be  agreed  in  the  GATT  (and  that  changes  in
domestic  policy  are  valid  reasons  for requesting  or  forcing  waivers  and  exceptions  under  the
GATT)  toward  an  acceptance  that GATT  rules  put constraints  on  the  shaping  of domestic
policies.  I am  pessimistic  about  whether  such  an  attitude  change  is  yet taking  place  in  the
political  power  structures  of the  major  players.
The  Relative  Timing  and Emphasis  to  Be  Put on Negotiating  Rules  versus Specific  Concessions
As  I  understand  it,  Canada  and  several  others  would  like  an  initial  phase  of the  negotiations
to  focus  on  strengthening  the rules,  with  specific  concessions  to  follow.  The United  States,  I
believe,  is favoring  getting  straight into  concessions,  on the  grounds  that attempts  to  change
the  rules would  result  in only  very  slow  marginal  adjustments.  The  EC may  want  to  spend
the first  year  on  further  analysis,  which  some  would  see  as  a  stalling  tactic,  while  others  may
perceive  a  genuine  need  for  European  politicians  and  their  electorates  to  be  more  convinced  of
the broader  economic  benefits of reduced  agricultural  protectionism  (on  the  basis  of
comprehensive  economic  analysis)  before  being willing  to  make significant  moves  to  free  up
agricultural  trade.
In the  past,  the  emphasis  has  been  on  specific  concessions  (in  particular  tariff reductions).
Rules  have  been  treated  as  somewhat  subservient  to  concessions  in  that exceptions/
derogations/waivers  were readily  adopted if acceptable  specific  concessions  could  be  found
which  contravened  the rules.  For the  future,  a  relevant question  may  be  "which  of the  two
allows  more  scope  for  circumvention?"
148The dominance  of  a few  major  players  has  allowed  a focus  on  bilateral  balancing  of
concessions  in past  rounds.  I  believe  that,  in  future,  with more  players  and  less  dominance,
this  won't  work  as  well.  A  multilateral  balancing  of concessions  would  theoretically  raise  the
potential  payoff from GATT  negotiations  to  most  or  all players.  However,  the  practical
difficulties  of  developing  a satisfactory  mechanism  for keeping  track  of all  the  multilateral
benefits  to  arise  from  a given  concession  (incorporating  all  the  intercommodity  and
intercountry  linkages  which  exist),  and  of developing  a procedure  for  truly  multilateral
negotiation  of concessions,  are  daunting.  This  is  the main  reason  why  I think  increasing
emphasis  may  have  to  be  placed  on  negotiating  (exceptionless)  rules  in this  and  future rounds.
Is  the Existing  GATT  Structure  and  Mechanism  Too  Constraining?
It would  appear that,  following  the  proposals  of the Committee  for Trade  in  Agriculture
(CTA), the  approach  in  the Uruguay  Round  will  be  to  follow  already-established  procedures
and  to  work  from existing  GATT  articles.  Given  the  hopes  and  recognition  of  the  need  for
substantial  progress  in agriculture  this  time  around,  should  the starting  point  be  closer  to
square  one?
Most  proposals  to  come out  of the  CTA  seem  to  refer  to  possible  changes  in just two  key
articles;  Article  XI  (notable  for permitting  quantitative  import  restrictions  if they exist  to
support a supply-management  policy)  and  Article  XVI  (which  exonerates  agricultural
subsidization  as  long  as  it does not  lead  to  an "unfair share  of the  world  market").  No  doubt,
delegates  who  have  been  involved  in past  rounds  will  remember  the time  and effort  involved
in reaching  agreement  on  the  existing articles  and  be  very  reluctant  to  give  up  hard-won
ground.
As they  stand,  Article  XI  is  seen  as  essentially  dealing  with  access  and  Article  XVI  with
subsidies,  and  there  appears  to  be  some  feeling  that their further  negotiation  can  be  separated
and  made  the  responsibility  of  two different  negotiating  subgroups.  Is  this  logical?  For
example,  it is  not feasible  for  a country  to  use  substantial  export  subsidies  without  import
controls,  yet one  of these  instruments  falls  under  "subsidies" and  the other  under  "access."
Similarly,  the whole  area  of administered  pricing  seems  to  be  treated  to  date  as  an  "access"
issue,  yet  the transfer  of  income from  consumers  to  farmers  via  regulated  prices  is  probably
in  many senses  a "subsidy" affecting  production  and  trade  (and  little different  from  a transfer
from  taxpayers  via government  expenditures).
Perhaps  the  time  is ripe  to  consider  the creation  of some  new,  specifically  agricultural
articles,  incorporating  imaginative  new  rules  extending  to  areas  not previously  touched  by  the
GATT.
Negotiations  on  Levels  of Subsidies,  Subsidy-Equivalents,  or  Trade-Volume  Effects
There  is considerable  interest  at  this  stage  in negotiating  commitments  to  reduce  levels  of
government  intervention  as  measured  by some  broad  economic  indicator.  The  producer  subsidy
equivalent  (PSE)  concept,  which  has  gained  prominence  through  its  use  in the  OECD's
"Agricultural  Trade Mandate"  study,  is most  frequently  referred  to,  but  other  alternatives  are
conceivable.  The  idea is  attractive  for several  reasons:
(a)  The  relative  simplicity  of reducing  negotiations  to  one  dimension  (a  practical  means
of  achieving  multilateral  balancing  of  concessions?
(b)  The  flexibility  it would  give  to  governments  to  choose  the precise  ways  of reducing
their levels  of assistance  or  interference;
(c)  A  means  to draw  even  the  commodities  with  the  most politically  powerful  lobbies
into the  scope  of the  negotiations.
149A  major subissue  is  what  precise  measure  to choose.  I will briefly  discuss  three possibilities:
(a)  Levels  of subsidies  in the  narrow  sense  of government  expenditures  or net  fiscal
cost.  This  can  be  dismissed  quickly  on the  grounds  that much  producer  support
(approximately  50  percent in  the OECD  countries  in  1979-81),  and  trade distortion,
derives  from  relatively  "costless"  (in a fiscal  sense)  transfers from  consumers  (see
also  Johnson);
(b)  Levels  of income  subsidization,  - for  example,  PSE's
Negotiating  reductions  in PSE  levels  appears  to  be  favored  by  many  in  the  United
States.  The  Australians  are talking  about  something  very  similar,  what  they  call
the "price  adjustment  gap."  Conceivably,  the  concepts  of "nominal  rate of
protection"  and "effective rate of  protection"  could  also  be  candidates.
Our big  objection  to  all these  indicators  is  that they  are  measures  of  income
support and  not of volume  or  trade distortion  (see  McClatchy  and  deGorter).  In  our
view,  it is the  latter  which  should  be  the  interest  and  focus  in trade  negotiations.
We  recognise  that if the overall  level  of world  farm income  assistance  were
reduced,  the  level  of trade distortion would  fall (as  demonstrated  recently  by the
OECD),  but also  that in particular  cases  the  level  of PSE  is  not  a reliable  indicator
of even  the  direction,  let  alone  the magnitude,  of  the associated  output  volume
effect and trade distortion.  Many examples  of current policies  involving  relatively
high  PSE's  and  relatively  low  trade effects  exist.  Given  the reasonable  arguments
that high-target  prices,  when  accompanied  by appropriate  levels  of  land  set-aside
requirements,  may  do nothing  to  increase  U.S. output  or reduce  world  prices,  I am
somewhat  surprised  at American  advocacy  of  this  as  a  negotiating  tool.  With  many
European  countries  favoring  moving  toward  supply  management  options,  I  doubt  that
the  idea will  appeal  to  them either.  Note  that  the  Punta Declaration  does  refer  to
a reduction  of the  negative  effects  of subsidies  (not  necessarily  the subsidies
themselves)  and  the  Danish vice-chairman  concluded,  after a  recent  debate  in  the
United  Nations  on  trade and agricultural  subsidies,  that "the  major  tasks  of the  new
GATT  round will be  to  seek  agreement  on  the  imacts  of  subsidies,  other farm
support  policies  and  trade  barriers  on the  present  distortions  in  agricultural  trade"
(my  underlining).
(c)  Levels  of Trade Volume  Impacts
A  "modified" or "adapted"  PSE  is  of  course  conceivable,  where  programs  and  policies
would  be  rated  in  terms  of their simple-subsidy-equivalency  in  a  production-  or
trade-distorting  sense,  rather than  in  the  income-enhancing  sense  of Josling's
original  or pure  PSE  concept.  This would  overcome  our major  objection,  and
perhaps  deserves  the  most  attention  as  a prospect  for use  in  the  GATT.  Some
serious  problems  and  issues,  both  of  a  theoretical  and  practical  nature,  would  still
seem  to  remain,  however.
In summary,  I think  this  particular  issue  is one  where  International  Agricultural  Trade
Research Consortium  (IATRC)  members,  as  a group  or as  individuals,  could  have  a  useful  input
into the  developing  GATT process.
The Extent of  Use  of Quantitative  Economic  Analysis  in  the  Uruguay  Round
This is  the  issue which  perhaps  most  directly  affects  us  as  IATRC  members.  I  refer  to  the
use  of such analysis  to  assist  in the choice  of individual  countries'  negotiating  positions  (and
potentially  also  in the  choice  of  negotiation  subjects),  both  initial  positions  and  responses  to
others' initiatives.
150My  impression  (though  I  lack  first-hand  experience)  is that the  analysis  underlying  agricultural
negotiating  positions  in past  rounds  was  generally  very  limited and  unsophisticated  (and
possibly  appropriately  so,  given the  focus principally  on  tariff  reductions).  This  time  I do
think  there  is  a much  greater  potential  for  the  use  of deeper analysis,  for both supply-side
and  demand-side  reasons,  such  as:
(a)  The  broader  scope  ("all measures  affecting  trade")  and  larger  number  of players
make  the  net  results  of any  potentially  negotiable  package  of  simultaneous  changes
much  less  transparent;
(b)  The  increased  awareness  (perhaps  even  incidence)  of cross-commodity  effects
necessitating  multicommodity  analysis;
(c)  the  increased  feasibility  due  to  the  technology  (for example,  microcomputers)  and
accumulated  modeling  experience  we  now have.
Just what  type  of analysis  will  be  required  depends,  I think,  on  the  resolution  of some  of the
foregoing  issues;  for example,  whether  the  rules being  negotiated  continue  to  be  predominantly
what  Anjaria  and others  would  call "measure-based"  or  whether  they become  increasingly
"effect-based,"  such  as  may  happen  if negotiations  on  PSE  reductions  and,  perhaps,  "acceptable
levels"  of  PSE's  proceed.
Looking  further  ahead,  after this  GATT  round,  I  think  it is  inevitable  that  there  will  be  more
call than  heretofore  in all  countries  for analyses  of likely trade  impacts  of  unilateral  domestic
policy  changes,  before  such  decisions  are  taken.
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